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As long as there has been democratic government, skeptics have worried that citizens would base their choices and their
votes on superficial considerations. A series of recent studies seems to validate these fears, suggesting that candidates who
merely look more capable or attractive perform better in elections. In this article, we examine the underlying process behind
the appearance effect. Specifically, we test whether the effect of appearance is more pronounced among those who know
little about politics but are exposed to visual images of candidates. To do so, we combine appearance-based assessments of
U.S. Senate and gubernatorial candidates with individual-level survey data measuring vote intent, political knowledge,
and television exposure. Confirming long-standing concerns about image and television, we find that appealing-looking
politicians benefit disproportionately from television exposure, primarily among less knowledgeable individuals.
Several recent studies indicate that candidates whosimply look more capable or attractive are morelikely to win elections (Atkinson, Enos, and Hill
2009; Ballew and Todorov 2007; Banducci et al. 2008;
Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2010; Hall et al. 2009;
King and Leigh 2009; Lawson et al. 2010; Rosar, Klein, and
Beckers 2008).1 For instance, Todorov et al. (2005) find
that candidates in U.S. Senate and House elections who
appeared more competent to naı¨ve student subjects en-
joyed markedly greater electoral success, even though the
subjects’ judgments were based on brief exposure to unla-
beled, black-and-white photographs of the candidates in
question. The results, they conclude, “suggest that rapid,
unreflective inferences can contribute to vote choices”
(2005, 1623).
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2A growing literature investigates the neurological bases of these judgments (Engell, Haxby, and Todorov 2007; Rule et al. 2009; Spezio
et al. 2008; Todorov, Baron, and Oosterhof 2008; Winston et al. 2002).
These findings are consistent with psychological
research indicating that people often judge unfamiliar
individuals based on their appearance, inferring person-
ality traits such as competence, intelligence, honesty, and
trustworthiness from facial features alone (Bar, Neta, and
Linz 2006; Hassin and Trope 2000; Zebrowitz 1997).2
People rely more heavily on such impressionistic assess-
ments when they know little else about the subjects of
their assessments—that is, they use appearance as a low-
information heuristic (Hassin and Trope 2000).
In this article, we test a prediction about the pro-
cess underlying the effect of appearance. If individu-
als do indeed use facial features as a low-information
heuristic, then citizens should rely disproportionately on
faces when they know little about candidates beyond their
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appearance. For uninformed voters to judge candidates
based on their appearance, however, they must actually
see images of the candidates.We therefore testwhether the
effect of appearance is particularly pronounced among
those who know little about politics but watch a good
deal of television.
Using individual-level voting data for 2006 guberna-
torial and Senate elections, we find strong support for
this prediction. People who are poorly informed about
politics but watch a good deal of TV cast their ballots
for governor and senator disproportionately on the way
candidates look. The pattern is almost identical in both
types of contests, and it holds when controlling for cam-
paign spending, incumbency, candidate experience, elec-
toral competitiveness, and party strength. It also survives
other robustness checks.
These findings have potentially important implica-
tions for the study of democratic politics. First, they lend
further credence to the notion that candidate appear-
ance influences citizens’ voting decisions, at times fa-
voring candidates who “look the part” over candidates
who share citizens’ policy views or are more qualified.
Second, our findings underscore the importance of vi-
sual images embedded in media messages (Graber 1996,
2001; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Lau and Redlawsk
2006;Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, andWhite
2002). Finally, our results speak to some of the concerns
scholars have long held about the influence of television
on electoral politics. As critics of the medium have ar-
gued, exposure to television does appear to encourage
image-based voting. By testing whether politicians who
merely look the part profit from TV exposure, especially
among less informed citizens, our analysis examines two
concerns about democracy: that citizens judge politicians
on superficial traits like appearance and that television’s
focus on image exacerbates this worrisome tendency.
The Effect of Appearance—AReview
of Recent Research
Research on candidate appearance and voting is burgeon-
ing. Most recent studies in this literature follow the same
general design. Naı¨ve subjects view images of candidates’
faces with all identifying information removed; they then
rate the candidates on various traits (e.g., apparent com-
petence), guess the outcome of the election, cast votes
in hypothetical contests, or offer some other summary
judgment. Researchers then use subjects’ responses to
predict candidates’ actual electoral performance. Studies
employing this approach have documented appearance
effects in a range of contests, such as U.S. House, Senate,
and gubernatorial races (Atkinson, Enos, and Hill 2009;
Ballew and Todorov 2007; Todorov et al. 2005), national
and municipal legislative contests in Finland (Berggren,
Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2010), Australian parliamentary
races (King and Leigh 2009), German legislative elections
(Rosar, Klein, and Beckers 2008), Brazilian gubernatorial
and Federal Deputy contests (Lawson et al. 2010), Cana-
dian federal parliamentary contests (Efron and Patterson
1974), and run-off elections for the French parliament
(Antonakis andDalgas 2009). Themagnitude of the effect
varies from one study to another, but it can be quite large.
In both Todorov et al. (2005) and Antonakis and Dalgas
(2009), naı¨ve coders correctly predicted the outcome of
approximately 70% of races. In Banducci and colleagues’
(2008) study—which focused on a low-information con-
test where photographs of candidates for urban devel-
opment boards appeared on the ballot—contenders who
looked best to raters had close to a 90% chance of win-
ning; their less appealing-looking rivals had only a 10%
chance.3
There are, of course, potential alternative explana-
tions for these findings. One such alternative is that raters
and voters may be responding to candidates’ race and
gender, rather than to their facial features. Another is that
raters may be more familiar with winners, even though
they report not recognizing them, and so rate them as
more competent or more likely to win (Zajonc 2001). A
third alternative is that harder-working or better-funded
candidates may procure better-looking pictures of them-
selves and so look better to raters.
Researchers have addressed these and other alterna-
tives from several angles. The appearance effect holds,
they have found, when:
1) candidates are matched on race and gender (e.g.,
Todorov et al. 2005);
2) raters are unfamiliar with the candidates because
they are from other countries (Berggren, Jordahl,
and Poutvaara 2010; King and Leigh 2009; Rule
et al. 2010; Lawson et al. 2010);
3) the pictures used for rating are from a standard-
ized source (Antonakis andDalgas 2009;Klein and
Rosar 2005);
4) differences in image quality and other aspects of
the pictures, such as visible light, are taken into ac-
count (Klein and Rosar 2005; Lawson et al. 2010);
3Earlier research investigated appearance effects using alternative
approaches (Rosenberg, Kahn, and Tran 1991; Rosenberg and
McCafferty 1987; Sigelman 1990; Sigelman et al. 1990; Sigelman,
Sigelman, and Fowler 1987).
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5) candidates are comparable in actual quality and in
resources (Antonakis and Dalgas 2009; Benjamin
and Shapiro 2009);
6) researchers control for candidate spending (Atkin-
son, Enos, andHill 2009) and party strength (Ben-
jamin and Shapiro 2009; King and Leigh 2009;
Lawson et al. 2010; Rosar, Klein, and Beckers
2008);4
7) legislators compete against members of their own
party (Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2010)5
and in nonpartisan contests (Banducci et al. 2008;
Martin 1978); and
8) researchers control for the apparent competitive-
ness of races at the time candidates are making
decisions about entering the race (Atkinson, Enos,
and Hill 2009).6
Our analysis pushes these tests still further in two
ways. First, we control for a richer set of candidate quality
and campaign effort variables than have previous studies.
Second, our prediction that individuals whowatch a good
deal of television and know little about politicswill be par-
ticularly susceptible to how candidates look constitutes a
unique test of claims about the electoral effect of appear-
ance. The alternative explanations do not obviously lead
to this prediction. For example, if the effect of appearance
arises simply because harder working candidates attract
more votes and procure more flattering photographs, we
would not necessarily expect the appearance effect to be
larger among high-TV/low-knowledge individuals. De-
pending on the intensity of the campaigns, we might
instead expect candidate effort to most affect individuals
at midlevels of political knowledge (Zaller 1992).
4Instead of using candidate pictures, Benjamin and Shapiro (2009)
showed raters short clips of gubernatorial debates either with
sound, with muffled sound, or without sound. Raters were best
able to predict elections in the without sound condition.
5That is, party and incumbency are included as fixed effects in
multimember districts.
6A final possibility is that, instead of representing an unreflective
bias in favor of appealing-looking candidates, the appearance effect
could represent a judgment about actual candidate quality. Voters
might believe that appearance reflects the influence of genes, health,
or someother factor,which in turnmakes better-lookingpoliticians
more effective leaders (e.g.,Case andPaxson2008). Studies examin-
ing the diagnostic validity of appearance have yieldedmixed results
and the accuracy of these judgments may vary by trait (Ambady,
Hallahan, and Conner 1999; Berry 1991; Hassin and Trope 2000;
Mueller and Mazur 1996; Olivola and Todorov 2010; Stirrat and
Perrett 2010; Wilson and Eckel 2006; Zebrowitz 1997; Zebrowitz et
al. 2002). So far, scholars have not examined whether appealing-
looking candidates make for more effective public servants.
Data
To test our central prediction, we combine data from
a survey that asks about vote choice, political knowl-
edge, and TV exposure with data about candidates’ faces
for 2006 gubernatorial and Senate elections. The sur-
vey is the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
(Ansolabehere 2007), which interviewed about 36,500 re-
spondents. The CCES is an opt-in Internet panel that uses
a novel approach to achieve a representative sample. Hill
et al. (2007) find that responses in this survey are not too
dissimilar from phone surveys, though the 2006 CCES
underrepresents those with lower levels of education and
political knowledge.
We use the CCES because its sample is sufficiently
large to assess media effects in state-level contests, be-
cause it contains a richer battery of political knowledge
and television items than do other large surveys, and
because it inquires into gubernatorial and Senate vote
choice. To the extent that the CCES overrepresents polit-
ically knowledgeable individuals, it may lead us to treat
moderately informed individuals as if they were poorly
informed. That fact, of course, would lead us to under-
estimate the actual difference in the effect of appearance
between low-knowledge and high-knowledge Americans.
For the dependent variable, we use Democratic vote
intention, coded 1 if the respondent planned to vote for
the Democratic candidate and 0 if she planned to vote for
the Republican (Vote). To measure political knowledge,
we create a 21-item scale from questions in the CCES
(reliability of .90; see Supporting Information online
for details). These items ask voters specifically about the
gubernatorial and Senate candidates (e.g., their party af-
filiation), aswell as about general political knowledge.7 Fi-
nally, to measure exposure to TV, we rely on self-reported
viewing. Approximately half of the CCES respondents
were asked nine questions about how frequently they had
watched particular genres of TV in the week before their
interview, such as national news, local news, sports news,
and entertainment shows (reliability = .70; see Support-
ing Information for details). In the analyses below, we
use both an unweighted average of answers to these items
(TV ) and an indicator variable for an above-the-median
score on this average (High TV ), which corresponds to
watching about 16 or more TV shows in the previous
7We include general political knowledge items because political
knowledge tends to be general (Zaller 1985)—the same people who
know about one aspect of politics also tend to know about others—
andbecause theCCES contains only a handful of candidate-specific
questions. In our tests, general political knowledge measures out-
performed candidate-specificmeasures, though our principal find-
ings hold with just the candidate-specific measures.
4 GABRIEL S. LENZ AND CHAPPELL LAWSON
week. Subtracting out those respondents who did not
get the battery on TV exposure, we have an average of
266 respondents per state who expressed a vote intention
in the gubernatorial contests and 314 who did so in the
Senate races. We use the CCES sampling weight in all
analyses.
For measures of candidate appearance, we rely on
data fromBallew andTodorov (2007, Experiment 3), who
collected ratings of the 2006 gubernatorial and Senate
races weeks before the actual election. They showed 64
student subjects pairs of similarly sized, black-and-white,
head-and-shoulder photographs of the main candidates.
The photos contained no identifying information, and
both the position of the winning candidate and the or-
der in which pairs were presented was randomized. The
instructions emphasized that participants should rely on
their “gut” reactions. Neither elections nor candidates
werementioned at any point. After seeing the pair of pho-
tographs, participants reported which candidate in the
pairing appeared more competent. To ensure that judg-
ments of competence were based solely on facial appear-
ance, not prior knowledge, Ballew and Todorov (2007)
excluded judgments for races in which the participant re-
ported recognizing any of the faces. For this article, we
simply recode these judgments as the proportion rating
the Democratic candidate more competent than the Re-
publican (Appearance advantage).8
In 2006, 36 states held gubernatorial elections and 33
held Senate elections.We have ratings of candidates’ faces
for all but the California gubernatorial race, and all but
the Connecticut, New York, Hawaii, and Indiana Senate
races; these states are excluded from the analysis. We thus
analyze 35 gubernatorial and 29 Senate races.
Television Slightly Increases the
Effect of Appearance among All
Respondents
Given that television is a visualmedium, voterswhowatch
a good deal of TV are likely to be disproportionately ex-
posed to images of candidates. If the literature on can-
didate appearance is correct, television viewers may then
rely on candidate appearance in decidingwhich candidate
to support. As a result, candidates who enjoy a significant
8According to the raters, Democratic candidates were at a slight
disadvantage in these races. About 46%rated theDemocrat asmore
competent-looking in gubernatorial races and about 45% did so
in Senate races. The standard deviation for Appearance advantage
is about .20 for gubernatorial and Senate races. See Supporting
Information for descriptive statistics.
advantage over their opponents in terms of appearance
should do well among television viewers. As discussed
above, however, this effect should bemuch greater among
thosewhoarepoorly informedaboutpolitics and less pro-
nounced among those who know a good deal. As a result,
it may be relatively modest overall.
To test how large this effect is, we conduct a series
of regression analyses (examining Senate and gubernato-
rial races separately). As in subsequent analyses, we use
individual-level Vote for the Democrat as the dependent
variable and estimate the effects with Linear Probability
Models.9 Given the multilevel data, we cluster the stan-
dard errors at the state level. For ease of interpretation,
we code all variables to vary between 0 and 1.
We begin with a simple model that includes the main
effects of Appearance advantage and the High-TV indi-
cator, as well as their interaction. If this interaction is
positive, then greater exposure to TV exacerbates the ef-
fect of appearance.We use the High-TV indicator instead
of the continuous TV scale to simplify the interpretation
of the interactions (switching to the TV scale strengthens
the results; see below). We include controls for Partisan
identification using the standard 7-point scale; presiden-
tial approval (Bush approval); a 5-point, self-assessed Ide-
ology scale; whether the respondent saw the invasion of
Iraq as a mistake (“Iraq was a mistake?”); and political
knowledge (for question wordings, see Supporting Infor-
mation).10 We code these variables so that higher values
are associated with more support for the Democrat.
Table 1 presents the results, showing unstandardized
regression coefficients from the linear probability mod-
els. These results are consistent with our expectation of
a modest but positive interaction between Appearance
advantage and television exposure.
In gubernatorial races, we see little effect of Appear-
ance advantage among either low- or high-TV respon-
dents (see Column 1); however, when we include the
attitudinal controls, such as party identification, the ef-
fect of candidate image increases from almost nothing
among low-TV respondents to about (0 + .07 = ) .07
among high-TV respondents, a significant increase (see
Column 2). The magnitude of these effects is modest.
Appearance advantage among gubernatorial candidates
has a range of .63, from .16 to .79 (that is, from pairings
9We use linear probability models because they are consistent
under weak assumptions and the estimates are simpler to inter-
pret, especially with interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003). For
the probit results, which yield the same findings, see Supporting
Information.
10Missing values on these control variables were imputed. The
results do not change with listwise deletion (see Supporting
Information).
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TABLE 1 The Effect of Television, Candidate Appearance, and Political Knowledge on
Individual-Level Vote for Democrat
DV: Gubernatorial Vote (for Dem.) DV: Senate Vote (for Dem.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Appearance advantage (for Democrat) 0.04 −0.00 0.23∗ 0.10∗
(0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Appearance advantage × High TV 0.03 0.07∗ 0.08∗ 0.11∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
High TV 0.14∗ −0.01 0.13∗ −0.03∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Low knowledge × Appearance advantage 0.11 0.02 0.40∗ 0.20∗
(0.20) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10)
Low knowledge × Appearance × High TV 0.21∗ 0.20∗ 0.15∗ 0.17∗
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Low mid knowledge × Appearance advantage 0.05 0.02 0.30∗ 0.08
(0.19) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06)
Low mid knowledge × Appearance × High TV −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 0.03
(0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
High mid knowledge × Appearance advantage 0.07 −0.02 0.32∗ 0.10∗
(0.14) (0.06) (0.13) (0.04)
High mid knowledge × Appearance × High TV −0.14 0.03 −0.08 0.04
(0.11) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04)
High knowledge × Appearance advantage −0.18 −0.05 −0.17 −0.06
(0.15) (0.05) (0.15) (0.04)
High knowledge × Appearance × High TV −0.09 −0.02 0.00 0.18∗
(0.09) (0.05) (0.15) (0.08)
Partisan identification 0.40∗ 0.40∗ 0.39∗ 0.39∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ideology 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.22∗ 0.22∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.012)
Bush approval 0.38∗ 0.38∗ 0.38∗ 0.38∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Iraq was a mistake? 0.14∗ 0.14∗ 0.18∗ 0.18∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Low mid knowledge 0.01 −0.02 0.03 0.01 −0.00 0.05
(0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
High mid knowledge 0.03∗ −0.03 0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.04
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
High knowledge 0.03 0.08 0.04 −0.01 0.15 0.09∗
(0.02) (0.14) (0.06) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05)
Low knowledge × High TV −0.01 −0.08∗ 0.00 −0.08∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Low mid knowledge × High TV 0.16∗ 0.09∗ 0.18∗ 0.10∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
High mid knowledge × High TV 0.33∗ 0.13∗ 0.25∗ 0.10∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
High knowledge × High TV 0.28∗ 0.13∗ 0.25∗ 0.05
(0.089) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06)
N 10273 10273 10273 10273 9980 9980 9980 9980
R2 0.02 0.59 0.04 0.59 0.04 0.65 0.05 0.65
SER 0.49 0.32 0.49 0.32 0.49 0.29 0.48 0.29
Note: ∗p < 0.1. Using individual-level voting models, this table shows two key findings for gubernatorial and Senate races. First, it shows that above-
the-median TV viewing (High TV) slightly exacerbates the effect of appearance on voting (Col. 1–2 and 5–6). Second, it shows that above-the-median
TV viewing especially exacerbates the appearance effect among low-knowledge individuals (Col. 3–4 and 7–8). It shows both findings without attitudinal
control variables and with these variables. The coefficients showing these findings are highlighted with boxes. The table presents unstandardized regression
(OLS) coefficients with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Each column shows a separate regressionmodel. All variables coded
to vary between 0 and 1 and so that higher values should correspond with support for the Democrat. Source for individual-level data: 2006 CCES.
where only 16% of raters felt the Democrat looked more
competent than the Republican to those where 79% of
raters felt the Democrat looked more competent). Thus,
among those respondents who are above the median on
TV viewing, a candidate with the highest appearance ad-
vantage would receive about (.63 × .07 × 100 = ) 4.4
percentage points more vote share than a candidate with
the worst relative rating.
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Television exposure more consistently accentuates
the role of appearance in Senate races, as shown in
the right side of Table 1 (Columns 5 and 6). With at-
titudinal controls, the effect is about .10 among those
who watch less TV and .21 (.10 plus .11) among
those who watch more, a statistically significant increase
(Column 6). Because Appearance advantage for the 2006
Senate contests ranges from .08 to .84, a candidate with
the highest facial competence rating would receive about
16 percentage points more vote share than a candidate
with the lowest competency rating among high-TV re-
spondents.11 Among low-TV respondents, this difference
is only 8 points.
All told, greater TV exposure appears to slightly in-
crease the overall effect of image, especially in Senate
races. Candidate appearance, these estimates also imply,
better predicts votes in Senate races than in gubernatorial
races, a pattern consistent with other findings (cf. Ballew
and Todorov 2007; Todorov et al. 2005). This is precisely
what we would expect if citizens rely on appearance as a
low-information heuristic, as senators and Senate races
receive less local media coverage, and spending in Senate
campaigns is generally lower than in gubernatorial cam-
paigns (see Supporting Information and Ansolabehere,
Snowberg, and Snyder 2006).
TelevisionMarkedly Increases the
Effect of Appearance among the Less
Informed
Graphical Analysis
Our central prediction, of course, is not that television
would exacerbate the appearance effect among all respon-
dents, but rather that it should do so among less politically
informed individuals. Less informed citizens who watch
television are exposed to candidates’ faces but are unlikely
to learn other information about them from television,
and so may rely on faces as a low-information heuristic.
To test this prediction, we begin by examining these data
visually. Figure 1 presents scatterplots of Democratic vote
share byAppearance advantage in the gubernatorial races,
showing these plots for Low knowledge (bottom quartile)
and Low mid knowledge (second from the bottom quar-
tile), and below and above the median TV exposure. To
simplify the figures, we do not show scatterplots for the
top two knowledge quartiles, though we do present ef-
fect estimates for them in the regression models. We fur-
ther simplify by switching from individual-level analysis
11(.84 – .08)×.21×100 = 16.0.
(used in Table 1) to state-level analysis, taking the average
vote share for each knowledge quartile within each state,
weighting by the number of respondents so smaller states
receive proportionately less weight.
Ourprediction is that appearance shouldmattermore
as television viewing increases among the less informed.
This is exactlywhatwe find in Figure 1.Candidate appear-
ance matters more (steeper slope) for gubernatorial vote
when less informed individuals watch a good deal of tele-
vision. As shown in the top-left scatterplot in Figure 1, the
regression slope is about .11 for high-TV/low-knowledge
respondents, suggesting that a 10 percentage point in-
crease in the share of raters who say the candidate looks
more competent leads to about a 1.1 percentage point
increase in vote share. Since the standard deviation is 20
percentage points (.20), 10 percentage point differences
are common. As shown in the top-right scatterplot, how-
ever, when these less informed respondents watch more
TV (high TV/low knowledge), the slope increases almost
threefold to .32, suggesting that a 10 percentage point in-
crease in the share of people who say the candidate looks
more competent leads to about a 3.2 percentage point in-
crease in vote share. In terms of the range, the latter effect
implies that a candidate with the highest competency rat-
ing (.79) would receive about 20 percentage points more
vote share than a candidate with the lowest appearance
rating (.16) among that group of voters—a large effect.
Figure 1 also shows that television fails to exacerbate
the appearance effect among more knowledgeable indi-
viduals. The bottom row presents these scatterplots for
low mid knowledge individuals, the second knowledge
quartile from the bottom. In this quartile, candidate ap-
pearance does not becomemore predictive of vote among
those who watch a good deal of television, nor does it be-
come so for the other knowledge quartiles, whichwe omit
from the figure but show in the regressions below. Thus,
while television appears to exacerbate the effect of candi-
date appearance among the bottom quartile of political
knowledge, it does not appear to do so among more po-
litically knowledgeable individuals.
A similar pattern holds in 2006 U.S. Senate races, as
indicated by the scatterplots in Figure 2. As with guber-
natorial elections, TV tends to exacerbate the effect of
appearance among less informed individuals. Among
low-TV/low-knowledge respondents, the regression slope
is about .40 (top left), suggesting that a 10 percentage
point increase in the share of people who say the candi-
date looks more competent leads to about a 4 percent-
age point increase in vote share. In contrast, when these
less informed respondents watch more TV (high TV/low
knowledge), the slope increases to .55 (top right), im-
plying that a 10 percentage point increase in the share
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FIGURE 1 Television Encourages Image-Based Voting among the
Ill Informed in 2006 Governors’ Races
Note: Candidate appearance better predicts vote intent in gubernatorial races among less
informed citizens (bottomquartile of political knowledge)who self-report above-the-median
TV exposure. The figure shows that this difference is absent among somewhatmore informed
citizens (low mid political knowledge quartile). The plots for other political knowledge
quartiles are not shown, though estimates from them are presented in Table 1. The dependent
variable is the share of respondents intending to vote for the Democratic candidate, excluding
nonmajor party voters, and the analysis is weighted by the number of respondents, so
small states like Nebraska receive almost no weight. The explanatory variable is Appearance
advantage. Political knowledge is measured with a 21-item index of responses to factual
questions. TV is measured with a 9-item scale about frequency of watching in the previous
week and is split at the median. Source for individual-level data: 2006 CCES.
of people who say the candidate looks more competent
leads to about a 5.5 percentage point increase in vote
share. (This effect implies that a candidate with the high-
est competency rating would receive about 35 percentage
points more vote share than a candidate with the lowest
appearance rating among that group of voters—an even
larger effect than for the gubernatorial races.) As with the
gubernatorial races, no similar increase occurs between
low- and high-TV exposure in the other knowledge quar-
tiles. The bottom row of Figure 2 presents this result for
the low mid knowledge quartile, and we show it for the
top two knowledge quartiles in the regressions analysis
below.
Regression Analysis and Attitudinal
Controls
To check whether the findings in Figures 1 and 2 are
statistically significant and robust, we estimate these ef-
fects using a linear probability model. (Probit models
yield similar results.) Because this analysis involves triple
interactions—that is, all possible combinations of ap-
pearance advantage with television exposure and political
knowledge—and the addition of a number of potentially
confounding variables, this section is necessarily techni-
cal. The key takeaway point, however, is straightforward:
these analyses confirm the graphical findings summarized
above.
For ease of presentation, we use statistical models
that closely resemble the structure of the scatterplots, but
with individual-level data instead of state-level data. The
top panels of Figure 1 showed that, for gubernatorial
races, the appearance effect increased from .11 among
low-knowledge/low-TV respondents to .32 among low-
knowledge/high-TV respondents. Column 3 of Table 1
tests whether this (.32 – .11 = ) .21 slope increase is
statistically significant. Its first coefficient, which is for
the interaction Low knowledge×Appearance advantage,
simply shows the same .11 slope as Figure 1 for low-
TV/low-knowledge individuals. The next coefficient in
Column3, whichwe highlight with borders, tests whether
the .21 increase induced by television exposure is statisti-
cally significant.We conduct this test with the triple inter-
action Low knowledge × Appearance advantage × High
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FIGURE 2 Television Encourages Image-Based Voting among the
Ill Informed in 2006 Senate Races
Note: Candidate appearance better predicts vote intent in Senate races among less informed
citizens (bottom quartile of political knowledge) who self-report above-the-median TV
exposure. The figure shows that this difference is absent among somewhat more informed
citizens (low mid political knowledge quartile). The plots for other political knowledge
quartiles are not shown, though estimates from them are presented in Table 1. The dependent
variable is the share of respondents intending to vote for the Democratic candidate, excluding
nonmajor party voters, and the analysis is weighted by the number of respondents, so small
states like Wyoming and Rhode Island receive almost no weight. The explanatory variable
is Appearance advantage, an average of naı¨ve students’ ratings of unlabeled, black-and-
white photographs of candidate pairs, with higher values indicating a Democratic advantage.
Political knowledge is measured with a 21-item index of responses to factual questions. TV is
measured with a 9-item scale about frequency of watching in the previous week and is split
at the median. Source for individual-level data: 2006 CCES.
TV—the key statistical test of this article. Since it tests
an interaction, its coefficient shows the slope increase,
.21, and finds that this increase is indeed statistically sig-
nificant (p < .035). Applying the same model to Senate
races, Column 7 shows that this key triple interaction is
slightly smaller in size for these races, .15, and is also sta-
tistically significant (p < .032).12 Thus, the finding that
appealing-looking candidates benefit disproportionately
from television exposure among low-knowledge individ-
uals is unlikely to be due to chance.
Besides showing that these increases are statisti-
cally significant, the coefficients in these columns (3
and 7) also show that appealing-looking candidates
12To allow for separate intercepts for each knowledge quartile, we
include the political knowledge indicators (Low knowledge is the
omitted category) and the double interactions between these indi-
cators and High TV. We do not include the main effects of Appear-
ance advantage or High TV because, with this setup, we estimate
these separately within each knowledge quartile, as we did in the
graphical analysis. The main effects and double and triple interac-
tions between Appearance advantage, High TV, and the knowledge
indicators are thus captured by our specification.
do not benefit from television exposure in any of the
higher political knowledge quartiles. The triple inter-
actions between, for instance, Low mid knowledge ×
Appearance advantage × High TV are small for guber-
natorial and Senate races. As we hypothesized, therefore,
appealing-looking candidates primarily benefit from tele-
vision exposure among the less informed.13
To ensure that these findings survive the attitudinal
control variables, Columns 4 and 8 of Table 1 add these
13In general, higher-knowledge individuals appear less affected by
candidate appearance, as shown by the smaller double interac-
tions, e.g. (Low mid knowledge × Appearance advantage), but the
effects are not zero, especially for mid-level knowledge individu-
als in Senate races. These individuals may still be influenced by
appearance because, despite being generally politically knowledge-
able, they may not know much about the specific candidates in
these races. Heuristics, such as appearance, may also continue to
bias their judgments even though they are also engaging in sys-
tematic processing about the races (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). One
anomaly is worth noting in Table 1: for Senate candidates, there is
a hint of our interaction for high-knowledge individuals. However,
this interaction is not present in the models without attitudinal
controls, nor is it robust to the controls used below (see Table 2).
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to the models. The results remain essentially the same.
Thus, the basic finding from the graphical analysis, that
TV exacerbates the effect of image among less informed
individuals, survives controls for the major issues of the
2006 election—presidential approval and attitudes about
the Iraq war—as well as controls for partisanship and
ideology (we examine more controls below).
Continuous TV Scale (Instead of Median
Split)
So far, we have used a median split on the television scale
(High TV). Although this approach has the advantage of
simplifying the interactions, it throws out a good deal of
relevant information on the extent of television exposure
(specifically, it disregards the variation in television ex-
posure within the High-TV and Low-TV groups). To test
the interaction of appearance with the continuous TV
measure, we reestimate the statistical models replacing
the indicator variable High TV with the continuous vari-
able TV, which ranges from 0 (watched none of the nine
types of television shows in the past week) to 1 (watched
all nine show types every day in the past week). This
measure has a mean of .33, and a standard deviation of
.18. Table 2 presents the estimates with continuous TV,
controlling for the attitudinal variables. This table shows
a large number of specifications, most of which are dis-
cussed in the next section, but Columns 1 and 8 show that
the key triple interaction (Low knowledge × Appearance
advantage×TV) is statistically significant and larger than
it was with the binary High-TV variable (compare with
Table 1, Columns 4 and 8). For Senate races, for example,
the triple interaction is .67, implying that a shift from
the least to themost competent-looking Democrat corre-
spondswith a 51 percentage point increase inDemocratic
vote share for individuals at the top of the TV scale over
the increase among those at the bottom, a large effect. For
individuals at the 75th percentile on the TV scale (.44 on
our 0–1 scale), the effect is still large: 22 percentage points.
In sum, switching from a dichotomous to a continuous
indicator of television exposure strengthens our finding.
Candidate Quality and Effort Controls
As discussed earlier, there are several alternative expla-
nations for recent findings on candidate appearance. For
example, harder-working candidates or candidates with
more party supportmay winmore votes and procure bet-
ter pictures; as a result, what seems like an appearance ef-
fect could theoretically be a product of strong candidates
having better “image management.” To check whether
these and other alternatives can account for the findings,
we add five new control variables to our model; we also
interact these controls with political knowledge quartiles
and TV viewing. This approach necessarily requires the
inclusion of a large number of interaction terms, which
makes the analysis even more complicated. Again, how-
ever, the takeaway point is straightforward: the effects
we document above are not the product of confounding
variables.
To control for candidate quality, we first assemble an
indicator of candidate experience in elected office (Ex-
perience advantage) that places greater weight on more
prominent offices; higher values indicate that the Demo-
cratic candidate is more experienced than his Republican
opponent. (See Supporting Information for details on
this and the other control variables.) Second, we create
a measure of educational achievement (Education advan-
tage); higher values indicate that theDemocrat completed
more schooling or attended more selective academic in-
stitutions than her Republican rival. Although thesemea-
sures are imperfect indicators of candidates’ true abilities,
they presumably correlate with qualities like effort and
ability that citizens value in their representatives (experi-
ence and intelligence). Third, we control for Incumbency,
which is coded 1 when the incumbent is a Democrat, 0
for open seats, and −1 when the incumbent is a Repub-
lican. Fourth, to capture campaign effort, we measure
the Democratic candidate’s share of campaign spending
among major party candidates (Spending advantage). Fi-
nally, we include a measure of competitiveness of the race
from The Cook Political Report , which takes eight values,
ranging from solidly Republican to solidly Democratic
(Cook ratings). We use Cook ratings from June 2005 to
capture the strategic environment before candidates com-
mit to the race (Atkinson, Enos, and Hill 2009). With the
exception of incumbency, we code all these variables to
range between 0 and 1.
One problem with controlling for these variables
(with the possible exception of Education advan-
tage) is that their causal relationship to appearance is
unclear. In fact, appearance may be causally prior to
these variables. Appealing-looking candidates may be in-
cumbents precisely because their looks influenced vot-
ers in previous elections. Likewise, appealing-looking
candidates may raise more campaign funds because
their looks directly or indirectly influence donors.
If so, controlling for these variables would lead us
to underestimate the total effect of appearance on
electability.
Another problem with controlling for these variables
is that they all strongly intercorrelate. In Senate races,
for instance, Appearance advantage correlates at .59 with
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Spending advantage, .56 with Incumbency, and .61 with
Cook ratings. The principal exception to these strong
correlations is Education advantage—arguably the most
exogenous measure of candidate quality—which corre-
lates with spending, experience, and vote, but not with
Appearance advantage.
Given that all these variables measure aspects of can-
didate quality and correlate highly, we do not showmod-
els with all these variables included simultaneously.14 In-
stead, we first estimate separate models controlling for
each quality variable on its own, interacting it with the
knowledgequartile indicators andcontinuousTV, includ-
ing all the double and triple interactions. Second, since
all of the candidate quality measures fall on one factor
in principle component factor analysis (first eigenvalue
= 3.78, second eigenvalue = .71), we create a candidate
Quality scale (Q. Scl.) using the factor weights. We then
control for this Quality scale and the interactions be-
tween it, knowledge quartile indicators, and continuous
TV (including all the double interactions and the triple
interaction).
When we add these variables to the model, we con-
tinue to find that appealing-looking candidates benefit
disproportionately from television exposure among low-
knowledge individuals. Table 2 presents the estimates,
with each column representing a model with a different
control variable and its interaction terms. Because the
double and triple interactions do not all fit into one table,
Table 2 only shows those for the bottom and top knowl-
edge quartiles. For gubernatorial and Senate races, the key
triple interaction between low knowledge, appearance,
and television remains similar in size and statistically dif-
ferent from zero at the 10% level or better in all models
(Columns 2–14). In sum, even when controlling for these
measures of candidate quality and campaign effort, we
still find that candidate appearance tends disproportion-
ately to influence voters who watch more TV and know
less about politics.
To provide additional robustness checks, we show a
variety of alternative specifications in Table 3. To present
them as efficiently as possible, we only show the key in-
teractions for each specification. The first set of estimates
shows that the triple interaction between Low knowl-
edge, Appearance advantage, and the TV scale remains
substantively large and statistically significant when con-
trolling for the interactions between the attitudinal vari-
ables, knowledge quartile indicators, and continuous TV
(including all the double and triple interactions). The
14The results largely hold when we do. In models that include all
controls and all interactions, the Low knowledge × Appearance
advantage × TV interaction is 0.52 (SE = 0.20) for Senate races
and 0.35 (SE = 0.24) for gubernatorial races.
TABLE 3 Additional Robustness Checks
Triple interactions TV×
Appearance
Advantage× (See Row)
×Low knowledge (bottom quartile) Gubernatorial Senate
With attitudinal interactions 0.55∗ 0.66∗
(0.15) (0.17)
With attitudinal & Quality scale 0.47∗ 0.45∗
interactions (0.19) (0.23)
With state-level long-term .49∗ .43∗
partisanship attitudinal & Quality scale
interactions
(0.20) (0.24)
Interaction with highest p-value dropping 0.44∗(NY ) 0.43∗(C A)
each state individually (0.18) (0.23)
Robustness to political knowledge thresholds
(With attitudinal & Quality scale interactions)
Political knowledge quintiles
× Bottom quintile 0.47∗ 0.46∗
(0.22) (0.28)
× Other quintiles (combined) −0.04 0.04
(0.14) (0.11)
Political knowledge sextiles
× Bottom sextile 0.47∗ 0.58∗
(0.24) (0.26)
× Other sextiles (combined) −0.03 −0.01
(0.15) (0.10)
Political knowledge septiles
× Bottom septile 0.43∗ 0.76∗
(0.22) (0.27)
× Other septiles (combined) 0.01 −0.03
(0.14) (0.12)
Political knowledge octiles
× Bottom octile 0.48∗ 0.73∗
(0.26) (0.24)
× Other octiles (combined) 0.01 0.00
(0.13) (0.13)
Candidates matched on race and gender (22/35 gubernatorial & 18/29 Senate)
(With attitudinal & Quality scale interactions)
× Bottom quarter 0.52∗ 0.70∗
(0.21) (0.31)
× Other quartiles (combined) −0.22∗ −0.14
(0.11) (0.13)
Candidates in races with only male candidates (25/35 gubernatorial & 23/29
Senate) (With attitudinal & Quality scale interactions)
× Bottom quarter 0.55∗ 0.52∗
(0.19) (0.29)
× Other quartiles (combined) −0.21 0.06
(0.12) (0.14)
Note: ∗p < 0.1. This table shows that the key triple interaction from
Table 2, Low knowledge × Appearance advantage × TV, survives a host
of robustness checks. It also shows that similar effects do not occur with
higher-knowledge groups. Unlike previous tables, this one only presents
the key triple interaction from the specified model. It begins by showing
that this triple interaction is similar in size and statistically significant
with additional controls and interactions (which are added to the models
in Table 2, Columns 1 [gubernatorial] and 8 [Senate]) and when each
state is dropped sequentially and the analysis rerun. It then shows that the
results are not sensitive to using the bottomquartile as the cutoff threshold.
Finally, it shows that the triple interaction also holds in races where the
candidates are all matched on race and gender and holds in races with only
male candidates. See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for more details and the
Supporting Information for additional robustness checks. Unstandardized
regression (OLS) coefficients with robust standard errors clustered at the
state level in parentheses.
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second set of estimates shows that this key interaction
also remains substantively large and statistically signif-
icant when, in addition to the attitudinal interactions,
we add the Quality scale and its double interactions and
triple interaction. The third set of findings adds state-
level partisanship and its double and triple interactions
to the same model. Although the model already controls
for party identification and its interactions, adding state-
level partisanship, measured as mean Democratic vote
share (of the two-party vote) in the previous four pres-
idential elections, further ensures that partisanship does
not explain the results. The fourth set of estimates shows
our findings do not depend on any particular state. That
is, the key triple interaction is substantively large and sta-
tistically significant when we drop each state individually
and reestimate the model. The table itself presents the
estimates for the highest p-value found, which emerge
when we drop the New York gubernatorial race and the
California Senate race.
Thenext set of robustness checks inTable 3 shows that
the findings are not sensitive to the use of political knowl-
edge quartiles. The table presents the triple interaction
for the bottom fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth of the po-
litical knowledge scale. For gubernatorial races, the triple
interaction remains statistically significant and similar in
size in all the low-knowledge groupings. For Senate races,
these triple interactions are also always statistically signif-
icant and become larger among lower-knowledge groups,
rising by about 50% in the bottom eighth. To show the ab-
sence of the key triple interactions for higher-knowledge
individuals, the table also presents them for the aver-
age of the higher-knowledge groups. Thus, if anything,
television’s tendency to encourage appearance-based vot-
ing increases as political knowledge declines; this find-
ing is not sensitive to using the bottom quarter as the
threshold.
To show that these results also hold when candidates
are matched on race and gender, the next set of esti-
mates shows the triple interaction for the bottom quartile
and the other quartiles (combined) in matched races.
Consistent with other research, the estimates show that
the triple interactions for low-knowledge individuals are
slightly larger and remain statistically significant, despite
the smaller sample size, in matched gubernatorial and
Senate races. Because research suggests differential effects
of candidate appearance with female candidates (Chiao,
Bowman, andGill 2008; Poutvaara, Jordahl, andBerggren
2009), we also show that the results hold when we ex-
clude all races where one or both candidates are female,
leaving us with 25 gubernatorial and 23 Senate all-male
races.
Conclusion
Since the advent of television, political observers have
fretted about the degree to which it privileges image over
substance (e.g., Mickelson 1976). The results we report
appear to confirm some of these long-standing fears.
Politicians who merely look the part benefit from TV,
especially among less informed citizens. Consider, for
example, the effect for Senate races, which is generally
larger than the effect in gubernatorial races. Among low-
knowledge individuals (bottom quartile), a 10 percentage
point increase in their appearance advantage leads to only
a .8 percentage point increase in vote share among those
who watch little or no television, a 2 percentage point
increase among those with average TV viewing, and a 4.8
percentage point increase among those who watch the
most TV.15 Since 10 percentage point differences in ap-
pearance advantage are common, as one standard devia-
tion is 20, the effect is considerable. In contrast, television
does not exacerbate the effect of appearance amongmore
knowledgeable individuals. Among those in the middle
two knowledge quartiles, for example, a 10 percentage
point increase in Appearance leads to a .8 percentage
point increase in vote share among those who watch zero
television, a 1 percentage point increase among thosewith
average TV viewing, and a 1.3 percentage point increase
among those who watch the most TV.
The magnitude of the appearance effect for high-
TV/low-knowledge individuals is comparable to other
electoral effects researchers have studied. For example,
research on newspaper endorsements typically finds that
they persuade 1%–5% of readers (Erikson 1976; Krebs
1998). Estimates of the incumbency advantage in U.S.
House elections find an effect of about five percentage
points in recent decades (for a review, see Ansolabehere,
Snowberg, and Snyder 2006).
The appearance effect for low-knowledge/high-TV
individuals is also robust. It holds when controlling for
standard attitudinal variables, such as party identification
and presidential approval. It holds when controlling for
measures of candidate quality and effort, such as incum-
bency and spending, and when controlling for state-level
partisanship. It holds when we include the interactions
between these control variables, political knowledge, and
television exposure. It holds when we exclude each state
from the analysis (that is, robust to state outliers). It holds
when we use political knowledge thresholds other than
quartiles. It holds when we examine only races where
15Estimates of the size of the effect are based on Table 2, Column
14.
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candidates are matched on race and gender. It holds
among races with only male candidates. Finally, it holds
independently in gubernatorial and in Senate races—a
key test of robustness on its own. By confirming this
prediction from psychology about using faces as a low-
information heuristic, these results thus add credence to
recent findings on candidate appearance.
All told, our findings pose in a new form the age-old
question of whether participation by less informed citi-
zens enhances or detracts from democratic government.
Certainly, shallow, image-based judgments are hardly
novel features of democratic politics. In the days be-
fore TV, critics of representative government regularly
lamented how some leaders could exploit their personal
charisma tomanipulate mass opinion. As JamesMadison
warned, people “misled by the artful misrepresentations
of interestedmen,may call formeasureswhich they them-
selves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and
condemn” (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1987, 63). Is the
modern analogue—looking good on TV—truly worse?
In some ways, it is not. Nevertheless, the combination of
widespread political disengagement in the citizenry with
saturation levels of exposure to visual images of candi-
dates is a distinctly modern phenomenon, bringing with
it distinctly modern problems. Moreover, there is no rea-
son to suspect that these problems are American; tele-
vision exposure is high, and political knowledge low, in
a range of countries, especially in the developing world.
Understanding the problems posed by this political en-
vironment and devising ways to address them remain
important challenges for political science.
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